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Twice in the last six years the Supreme Court decided cases requiring a
definition of the first amendment rights of public utilities in the arena of political
speech.' In Consolidated Edison v. Public Service Commission,2 the Court ruled that
* Professor, University of Florida College of Law; B.S.B.A., 1967, M.B.A., 1968, Ph.D.,
1970, University of Florida; J.D., University of North Carolina, 1977.
I would like to thank Mark Fogelman, Sara Wilson, and my colleague, James Quarles, for
their patience and insights.
1. The Court also addressed the issue of restrictions on the commercial speech of public
utilities in Central Hudson Gas v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). See infra text
accompanying notes 141-53. See generally Note, Billing Inserts: A Unique Forum for Free Speech Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 30 DE PAUL L. REV. 705 (1981) (time, place
gr manner restriction based on content is valid given unique nature of utility, monopoly, captive
audience, and greater access to forum); Note, Consolidated Edison v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 1981
Wis. L. REv. 399 (case fails to address state's concern of equalizing access of consumers and statecreated monopolies to the resources of communication).
2. 447 U.S. 530 (1980); see infra text accompanying notes 15-32.
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a state may not prohibit a utility from including politically oriented inserts in
its billing envelopes. More recently, in Pacific Gas & Electric v. Public Utilities
Commission,3 a generally anticipated sequel to Consolidated Edison,4 the Court held
that the state had violated the first amendment rights of a public utility by
ordering it to carry inserts containing messages with which the utility disagreed.'
The latter case is significant because it ties together two strands of first
amendment thought concerning the expressive rights of corporations. The first
strand originated with First National Bank v. Belotti6 in which the Court held
that corporations qualify for first amendment protection from state limitations
on speech. The second strand, which finds its genesis in West Virginia State Board
of Education v. Barnette' and which the Burger Court applied in Abood v. Detroit
Board of Education" and Wooley v. Maynard,9 offers protection from association
with speech with which the individual disagrees. An unresolved question was
whether this associational right, or "negative" free speech right, extends to
corporations. Pacific Gas & Electric indicates that it does. 0
The thesis of this article is that, whatever the merits of Consolidated Edison
and Pacific Gas & Electric as far as increasing the first amendment protection
afforded corporations generally, they are not commendable as guidelines for the
treatment of public utilities. Public utilities have an economic character which
distinguishes them from all other speakers including other corporations. The
simple economic reality is that public utilities are government-created players
in the "marketplace of ideas" with a unique ability to pass the cost of their
political activities to consumers who have little choice but to pay. Yet, in both
Consolidated Edison and Pafic Gas & Electric, the Court ignored economic factors
and doggedly adhered to an agenda of defining first amendment rights as ultimately emanating from the ownership of property."

3. 106 S. Ct. 903 (1986).
4. See generally Harrison, Public Utilities in the Marketplace of Ideas: A 'Fairness' Solution for a
Competitive Imbalance, 1982 Wis. L. REv. 43 (examining broadcaster/public utility analogy and application of "fairness" obligations to utilities); Comment, Public Utility Bill
Inserts, Political Speech,
and the First Amendment: A Constitutionally Mandated Right to Reply, 70 CAL. L. REv. 1221 (1983) (first
amendment requires utilities to afford opposing groups a right to reply in billing envelopes when
utility uses envelope to voice its opinion on controversial issues); Note, Utiliy Companies and the
First Amendment: Regulating the Use of Political Inserts in Utility Bills, 64 Va. L. Rev. 921 (1978).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 61-126.
6. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
7. 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (holding unconstitutional a state requirement that school children
participate in a flag salute ritual).
8. 431 U.S. 209 (1977); see infra text accompanying notes 25-32.
9. 430 U.S. 705 (1977); see infra text accompanying notes 123-25.
10. 106 S. Ct. at 914. The plurality in Pacific Gas & Electric did not regard the issue before
the Court as directly raising the question of whether corporate speakers have associational rights
generally. Instead, the opinion assumes that corporate speakers have associational rights equal to
those of other speakers. Justice Rehnquist's dissent focused on the distinction between the associational interests of individuals and those of corporations. Id. at 920-22.
1 . See generally Dorsen & Gora, Free Speech, Property, and the Burger Cour: Old Values, New
Balances, 1982 Sup. CT. REv. 195; Van Alstyne, 77e Recrudescense of Property Rights as the Foremost
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Initially, I focus on. Consolidated Edison. Here, despite Justice Blackmun's
warnings in dissent,12 the Court failed to separate satisfactorily the first amendment issue it faced from general issues of ratemaking and economic regulation. In particular, the Court fell victim to two regulatory fallacies, which
if properly understood would have pointed the Court toward different treatment
of public utilities in first amendment cases. In so doing, it neglected an important issue concerning the associational rights of ratepayers.
My analysis of the Court's most recent encounter with the expressive rights
of utilities suggests that Pacific Gas & Electric reflects more than simple insensitivity to economic factors. First, the majority selected a formulation of the
question on appeal that appeared to raise directly an issue it was predisposed
to decide. Having selected its issue, a plurality of the Court then set off on
an analysis lacking in convincing logic or adherence to precedent. Moreover,
its reasoning is marred by the conclusion that the property interest of ratepayers
is subordinate to that of utilities in determining first amendment rights. It is
naive, however, to seek to explain the result as merely the product of misguided
reasoning. Instead, the holding appears to be part of a continuing effort by an
activist Court to maintain-indeed, even strengthen - the link between the ownership of property and the right to speak freely.
The final section of this article examines the issues left unsettled by ConsolidatedEdison and Pacific Gas & Electric. Has the Court left any leeway for states
wishing to off-set the inherent advantage utilities have in disseminating their
political messages? Pacific Gas & Electric, despite some cryptic language that
suggests otherwise, has apparently ended the political insert option. A door left
open, or at least not yet closed, concerns a state's right to require, directly or
indirectly, a utility to use its billing envelope to carry the commercial speech
of others. Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. New York Public Service Commission, "'
in which the Court equates utilities' commercial speech rights with those of
other speakers, offers a test which may be adopted to measure the constitu4
tionality of "compelled" commercial speech.'
I.
A.

PUBLIC UTILITIES, SPEECH AND REGULATORY FALLACIES

Unique Resources, Associational Rights and Consolidated Edison

In considering the political insert ban' at issue in Consolidated Edison, the
Court first relied on First National Bank v. Belotti 6 and found that the political
speech of utilities was protected.' 7 The Court responded to three different ar-

Prindple of Civil Liberties: The First Decade of the Burger Court, 43

12.

447 U.S. at 548-56.

13.

447 U.S. 557 (1980).

LAw

& CONTEMP. PROBS. 66 (1980).

14. See infra text accompanying notes 141-53.
15. A request by the Natural Resources Defense Council for access to the utility's billing
envelope initiated the Consolidated Edison litigation. 447 U.S. at 532.
16.

435 U.S. 765 (1978).

17.

447 U.S. at 533-35.
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guments presented in support of the position that a compelling state 'interest
necessitated the restriction. Two of the Court's responses are particularly enlightening because they reveal its misunderstanding of, or insensitivity to, the
economic character of public utilities."
First, the New York Public Service Commission argued that the utility's
inclusion of political inserts in the billing envelope eliminated the possiblity of
using that same unique resource for other messages like those promoting conservation or safety."' In essence, the Commission characterized the space inside
the envelope as a scarce resource analogous to a broadcast frequency and thereby
sought to bring the case into the ambit of Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. ECC.2'1

The Court, however, rejected the broadcast spectrum analogy, noting that "the
Commission has not shown on the record before us that the presence of the
bill inserts would preclude the inclusion of other inserts that Consolidated Edison
might be lawfully ordered to include in the billing envelope.'"'21
Although the Court's rejection of the billing envelope/broadcast frequency
analogy may have been correct, it neglected a more fundamental analogy. The
critical comparison is not between broadcast frequencies and billing envelopes,
but rather between broadcast licensees and public utilities themselves. In both
cases the speaker is assigned a right which carries with it a special status
affecting its ability to communicate. In the case of broadcasters, the right is
in the form of exclusive access to a broadcast frequency without any requirement
that the broadcaster's message be balanced or unbiased. In Red Lion, the Court
held that the "fairness doctrine" was a constitutionally-sound response to this
imbalance.2 In the case of utilities, the right is in the form of an exclusive
license to supply a necessary service. This exclusivity insulates the utility as a
speaker from many of the economic restraints affecting competing speakers.'
The ban in Consolidated Edison did not prohibit the utility from using other
18. A third argument was that the restriction was required to avoid forcing Consolidated Edison's views on a captive audience. The Court rejected this argument because customers could avoid
the views of Consolidated Edison "simply by transferring the bill insert from envdope to waste
basket." Id. at 540-42.
The Court also rejected the argument that the ban was a reasonable time, place, or manner
restriction. That justification, the Court reasoned, did not apply to this case because the ban was
not a content-neutral limitation. Id. at 535-37. Similarly, the prohibition was not a permissible
subject-matter regulation. Id. at 537-40. The Court distinguished Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828
(1976), and Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974), the two primary cases which
applied this exception, as involving access to a public facility. 435 U.S. at 539-40. The outcome
in those cases, according to the Consolidated Edison majority, resulted from "the special interests of
a government in overseeing the use of its property." 447 U.S. at 540. The political insert ban
did not present the same facts and interests.
19. 447 U.S. at 542-43.
20. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 687-700
(1978) (discussion of Abood); Comment, Reconciling Red Lion and Tornillo: A Consistent Theory of
Media Regulation, 28 STAN. L. REv. 568 (1976) (significantly greater government involvement in
the affairs of broadcast media than in publishing industry).
21. 447 U.S. at 543. The Court did not specify what material a utility might lawfully be
ordered to include in the billing envelope.
22. 395 U.S. at 385-401.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 3349.
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media for the dissemination of its political messages. Instead, like the "fairness
doctrine," its effect was merely to off-set some of the communicative advantage
bestowed upon the speaker by the state.
The Court also rejected the argument that the prohibition was necessary to
prevent ratepayer subsidization of the utility's political inserts, a possible violation of the associational rights of ratepayers. Here, the Court off-handedly
noted the absence of anything in the record to indicate that the Commission
could not prevent subsidization through some method of cost allocation.2 4 By
rejecting the ratepayer subsidization argument, the Court apparently presupposed the existence of some method of allocating costs to avoid ratepayer subsidization. This supposition underlies the Court's vulnerability to the fallacies
inherent in the ratemaking process.
Its failure to respond adequately to the issue of the associational rights of
ratepayers is especially dissappointing in light of Justice Blackmun's recognition
of the problem in dissent. Justice Blackmun realized that the real question in
Consolidated Edison was the degree of first amendment protection to be afforded
ratepayers who unwittingly find themselves supporting political speech with which
they may not agree.2 5 In fact, the most striking feature of Consolidated Edison
is its resemblance to Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,2 6 decided just three years
earlier. Abood concerned an "agency shop" arrangement, permitted under Michigan law, requiring all local government employees to pay fees to the union
representing them even if they were not members of that union.2 The union
used some of these funds for political activities unrelated to collective bargaining.
In essence, the agreement required individuals to share the expense of promoting
political positions with which- they might not personally agree as a condition
of government employment. The Court held that this coercion violated the first
2
amendment rights of non-union employees. 1
In Consolidated Edison, only Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist recognized the
Abood-like nature of the problem. The circumstances in Consolidated Edison were
no less coercive than those in Abood. A government-created monopoly seller of
an essential service - the counterpart to an agency shop - would sell only
to those who would contribute to the political activities of the monopoly, whether
or not the buyer agreed with those activites.2 9 Justice Blackmun observed that
the only way to avoid subsidization was to allocate not only the extra cost of

24. 447 U.S. at 543.
25. Id. at 548-56.
26. 431 U.S. 209 (1977). See generally Gaebler, Union Political Activity or Collective Bargaining?
F-st Amendment Limitations on the Use of Union Shop Funds, 14 U.C.D. L. REv. 591, 597-619 (1981)
(analyzing distinction between permissible and impermissible uses of union shop funds); Karst, The
Supreme Court 1976 Tein, 91 HARV. L. Rav. 1, 188-98 (1977) (impermissible union expenditures
not germane to collective bargaining violate public employees' constitutional rights); Comment, The
Regulation of Union Political Activity: Majority and Minority Rights and Remedies, 126 U. PA. L. Rav.
386, 414-23 (1977) (state action required to provide first amendment protection).
27. 431 U.S. at 211-12.
28. Id. at 233-36.
29. The agency shop arrangement gives the union monopoly-like power in the market for
the "right" to government employment.
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the utility's insert to its shareholders, but all of the fixed costs of mailing as
well. "" In fafct, the insert medium was attractive to the utility primarily because
it could avoid mailing costs by including its message in the billing envelope.
A cost allocation structured to eliminate completely this "free ride," according
to Justice Blackmun, would be tantamount to an outright ban because it would
destroy the incentive to use the bill insert medium.3 ' Thus, he concluded, "there
is no way for the State to achieve its important goal - protecting the ratepayers
from a forced subsidy of ideas with which they disagree - that is less restrictive
than a total ban.'"'"2
B.

The Regulatory Fallacies of Consolidated Edison

The majority in Consolidated Edison dismissed the ratepayer subsidization
problem by noting the lack of evidence for the conclusion that a simple cost
allocation would not remove the utility's "free ride." Justice Blackmun's convincing refutation points out the fallacy in believing that a simple allocation of
mailing costs to the utility would fully eliminate the involuntary subsidization.
Clearly, such an allocation must extend beyond simply assessing the utility for
the full cost of postage and the mailing envelope. The cost advantages the
utility enjoys extend to its personnel, as well as its office space, storage areas,
purchase discounts and more general economies of scale. The process of determining an allocation that is precisely correlated to the advantage of using
the billing envelope may well be impossible or, at least, an accountant's nightmare of enormous proportion. :1 A simpler alternative would be to charge the
34
utility the cost of sending its message through conventional means.
Although this fallacy was a major stumbling block for the Consolidated Edison
majority, the Court missed a more fundamental insight into the impossibility
of treating first amendment and rate regulation issues as mutually exclusive.
Both the majority and Justice Blackmun seem to accept the premise that, in
theory at least, some method of shielding ratepayers from the political expenditures of the utility exists. This premise overlooks the fact that rate regulation is, in large measure, a futile process vis-a-vis the protection of ratepayers.
The goal of rate regulation is to set rates that allow the utility to recover
the costs of serving its customers, while permitting shareholders to receive a
fair return on their investment. The total revenue that must be generated to
achieve this end is typically computed by using the following formula:

30.

447 U.S. at 554-55 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

31. Id.
32. Id.
33.

Fixed cost could only be allocated indirectly.

34. Even the fully allocated cost approach involves a narrow notion of the extent of subsidization which the utility enjoys. The utility's inserts occupy space which is probably salable to
other advertisers. Thus, the utility's exclusive use of the space involves an opportunity cost. Revenues generated through the sale of the space could be applied to lower rates. From one point of
view, therefore, the level of subsidization, or the cost of carrying the message of the utility is the
income foregone by not selling the space to the highest bidders. Ste infra text accompanying notes
127-30 & 152-53.
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R = C + Ir5

where,
R = revenue requirement

C = operating expenses (expenses of resources to be consumed within a
year)
I = rate base (the value of fixed assets minus depreciation)
r = the rate of return (set to equal the utility's cost of capital)
This formula does not dictate the amount the utility may spend, but rather
it delineates which expenditures may be included in the rates charged to consumers. Thus, regulatory officials generally do not prohibit expenditures unnecessary for supplying services to consumers but simply disallow these expensesas part of the legitimate charges made to ratepayers.3 6 Theoretically, expenses
not recovered from ratepayers are reflected as reduced profits for shareholders.
A number of controversies have arisen in this context. For example, should
the full purchase price of materials procured from an unregulated subsidiary
be passed on to consumers? 37 Who should pay for the utility's charitable contributions: ratepayers or shareholders? 8 A current debate centers around who
will pay for investments in nuclear power facilities that have proven to be more
39
expensive than anticipated or that may never be used.
For the purposes at hand, the question is how much of the expense generated
by a utility's promotional or political speech should be allowable as an operating
expense and, therefore, paid by consumers? Generally, regulatory officials do
not treat expenses for promotional or political advertising as allowable. 40 An

35. T. MORGAN, J. HARRISON & P. VERKUIL, ECONOMIC REGULATION OF BUSINESS 223 (2d
ed. 1985).
36. See generally P. GARFIELD & W. LovEjoY, PUBLIC UTILITv ECONOMICS 44-83 (1964) (regulation of operating expenses and public utility rate base); I A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 20-57 (1970).
37.

See, e.g., In re Montana-Dakota Utils. Co., 278 N.W.2d 189 (S.D. 1979).

38. Compare New England Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Department of Pub. Utils., 360
Mass. 443, 275 N.E.2d 493 (1971) (charitable contributions may be treated as operating expenses
for ratemaking purposes) with Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 62
Cal. 2d 634, 401 P.2d 353, 44 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1965) (for rate-fixing purposes utility must exclude
from operating expenses all amounts claimed for dues, donations, and contributions).
39. See, e.g., Office of Consumers' Counsel v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 67 Ohio St. 2d 153,
423 N. E.2d 820 (1981). See generally Pierce, The Regulatory Treatment of Mistakes in Retrospect: Cancelled
Plants and Excess Capacity, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 497 (1984) (traditional doctrines of public utility
regulation are insufficient to resolve problems of mistaken investments).
40. See, e.g., Alabama Power Co. v. Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 359 So. 2d 776 (Ala.
1978); New Mexico Gas Co., 28 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 20 (N.M.P.S.C. 1978); Madison Gas &
Elec. Co., 34 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 569 (Wis. P.S.C. 1980). See generally Comment, State Regulation

of Advertising of Investor-Owned Electric Utilities: Their Development of Standards and Their Constitutional
Limits, 12 IND. L. REv. 603, 611-35 (1979) (regulatory commissions have tightened restrictions on
advertising expenses); Comment, Electric and Gas Utility Advertising: The First Amendment Legacy of
Central Hudson, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 459, 473-76 (1982) (discussing current advertising policies in
utility regulation).

This trend results partly from the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 16, 30, 42 & 43 U.S.C.).
See T. MORGAN, J. HARRISON & P. VERKUIL, supra note 35, at 247-48. The Act lists a number of
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examination of the consequences when a utility incurs political (or any) expenses
not chargeable to ratepayers reveals the regulatory fallacy of this disallowance.
The profit of the utility decreases when shareholders bear these costs. Potential
investors will regard investment in the. utility as a greater risk than other opportunities. 4 This uncertainty increases the cost of capital to the utility. The
"r" in the formula 42 will eventually reflect the increased cost of capital, and
disallowed expenses will be indirectly charged to ratepayers.
Of course, the "r" will not adjust immediately or fully reflect the magnitude
of the utility's disallowed expenditures. Moreover, the utility's management may
respond to the disallowance of a particular expense and stop incurring it; to
be sure, it is not a feather in any manager's cap to be associated with a utility
increasingly viewed as a poor investment. On the other hand, the allocation
of an expense to shareholders falls well short of assuring that ratepayers will
not eventually bear the financial burden through an adjustment in the rate of
return.
The "free ride" and rate of return phenomena suggest that the Supreme
Court's casual rejection of the Abood issue in ConsolidatedEdison was short-sighted.
More importantly, these factors combine with the public utility's general insulation from competitive market forces and elevate public utilites above other
speakers in the "marketplace of ideas." All other speakers must rely on either
a limited stock of wealth or a flow of income to finance speech. In essence,
they must make a decision regarding the use of limited resources. To exhaust
wealth or income on one activity is to pass-up other opportunities. In most
businesses, the impact of increased sales prices limits expenditures in support
of political activities.43 Even if sales remain relatively constant, however, expenses
that cannot be justified in terms of enhanced profitability eventually make the
firm an attractive takeover target to those who perceive an opportunity for more
44
efficient and profitable operation.
These limitations, however, do not readily apply to public utilities. First,
controls on the rate of return a regulated firm can earn probably decrease its
attractiveness as a takeover target.4 5 Second, public utilities enjoy revenue genstandards which states must apply to electric and gas utilities if the standards conserve energy,
promote efficiency, and encourage equitable rates. A standard of particular interest prohibits utilities
from recovering "from any person other than the shareholder. . . any direct or indirect expenditures
...for promotional or political advertising." 16 U.S.C. S 2623(bX5) (1982).
41. See P. GARFIELD & W. LovEjoy, supra note 36, at 47; T. MORGAN, J. HARRISON & P.
VERKUIL,

supra note 35, at 263-64.

42. "r" is the weighted average of costs of the various sources of capital. Increased risk will
probably increase the cost of capital from all sources.
43. Economists call this "demand elasticity." Demand elasticity measures how rapidly a firm
will lose sales as it increases price or will increase sales as it decreases price. Firms that produce

necessary goods with few competitors generally face relatively inelastic demand. Thus, a certain
percentage change in price will result in a lower percentage change in the quantity demanded. See
generally C. FERGUSON & S. MAURICE, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 20-34 (3d ed. 1978).
44. See generally Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding
to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1161 (1981) (current legal rules allowing management to engage
in defensive tactics in response to a tender offer decrease shareholders' welfare).
45. Regardless of risk and expense of the takeover attempts, the prospective owners would
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erating capacities similar in many respects to the power to tax.4 For example,
because of licensing and the nature of the services sold, ratepayers have little
alternative but to pay their bills and the utility's expenditures incorporated
therein.4 7 Moreover, the state may dictate the amount of revenue raised as well
as the eventual recipients of the revenue and of the utility's services. In addition,
the process of collecting revenues and delivering services can have a deliberate
redistributive effect. 48 In the economist's jargon, public utilities are imperfect
49
competitors in all of the markets in which they compete.
C.

The Aftermath of Consolidated Edison

After Consolidated Edison, regulatory commissions wishing to curb the advantages utilities enjoy by using billing envelopes were left with two alternatives.
First, allocating to the utility a greater proportion of the cost of a mailing when
a political insert is included would provide some disincentive to billing envelope
use. In fact, in the wake of Consolidatd Edison, the New York Public Service
Commission began a program of allocating bill mailing expenses on a fifty-fifty
basis between ratepayers and the utility whenever a political insert was included. ' An appeal to the United States Supreme Court on the basis of the
first and fourteenth amendments was dismissed for lack of a substantial federal
question."'
We are left to speculate on the rationale for finding the claim to be insubstantial. One possibility is that the Court felt a first amendment issue was
not raised at all. That is, the cost allocation measure did not prohibit speech
and was, therefore, a matter of simple economic regulation. On the other hand,
the Court could have reasoned that this was the least restrictive means of
avoiding ratepayer subsidization of the utility's political speech. This latter train
of thought seems unlikely because it would require the Court to determine that
the state does have a compelling interest in precluding the use of payments by
face the prospect of an earnings limit that may not produce a satisfactory return on the takeover
investment. Although the price paid in a takeover bid would theoretically reflect this risk as well
as the risk inherent in commission regulation generally, these additional risks would make ascertaining the appropriate level of takeover investment especially difficult.
46. A charitable contribution by the utility is either directly recoverable from ratepayers as
an operating expense or eventually recovered, even if disallowed, through the cost of capital adjustment. Management and regulators can make social welfare decisions and finance them through
the rate charged to ratepayers.
47. Because utilities are the sole sellers of an essential service individuals cannot easily avoid
paying a periodic levy.
48. See,e.g., American Hoechest Corp. v. Department of Pub. Utils., 379 Mass. 408, 399
N.E.2d 1 (1980); Apartment House Council v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 332 A.2d 53 (D.C. 1975).
See generally R. POSNER, EcoNoMiC ANALYSIS OF LAw 334-37 (3d ed. 1986) (internal subsidization
inefficient method of taxation); Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcoN. & MOUT. Sc. 22

(1971).
49. In other words, they possess market power in both the marketplace of ideas and the
markets in which their services are sold.
50. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 66 N.Y.2d 369, 488 N.E.2d 83, 497
N.Y.S.2d 337 (1985), appeal dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 1627 (1986).
51. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 106 S. Ct. 1627 (1986).
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ratepayers for the political activities of the utility. This particular step in the
analysis would seem to be questionable enough to require comment by the
Court.
Ironically, little of substance distinguishes the New York action giving rise
to the original Consolidated Edison, and the more recent action which the Court
dismissed. In Consolidated Edison, the Commission did not prohibit political speech
by utilities, but raised the price of such speech by eliminating a highly subsidized
forum. Through its subsequent cost allocation program, the Commission accomplished the same result, raising the price of political speech. The Court's
denial of review suggests that a state may use indirect means to accomplish
ends unachievable through direct action. Whether an assignment of all the costs2
of such a mailing would merit the Court's review is an unanswered question.
A second strategy seemingly available to states after Consolidated Edison was
to off-set the impact of allowing utilities to use billing envelopes by granting
access to other speakers. The goals of such a policy are to increase the diversity
of views found in the billing envelope and to promote citizen participation in
the regulatory process. 53 In some states these objectives have taken the form of
legislatively created Citizens' Utility Boards (CUBs) which are granted access
4
to billing envelopes for the purposes of soliciting membership and funds.1
The Public Service Commission of California employed a variation of this
approach which gave rise to Paific Gas & Electric. The Commission granted an
organization called Toward Utility Rate Normalization (TURN) access to the
billing envelopes of Pacific Gas and Electric "for the purpose of soliciting funds
to be used for residential ratepayer representation in the proceedings of [the]
Commission involving PG&E.""5 The Commission placed no restrictions on the
content of the inserts other than requiring an indication that their purpose was
to solicit financial support."b Solicitations by TURN included a notification that
the message was not the utility's. 5 7 The California approach differed from that

used elsewhere in that the Commission granted a private organization, rather
than a legislatively created one, access to the billing envelope. In addition,
control over message content was less pervasive under the California scheme. s
C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE S 3564 (1986).
53. See Toward Utility Rate Normalization v. Pacific Gas & Elec., 70 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th
183, 197 (Cal. P.U.C. 1984); Statement of Policy Governing the Access of Intervenor Organizations
to the Extra Billing Space in the Utilities' Billing Envelopes, Case 28655 (N.Y.P.S.C. May 14,
1984).
54. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 2/3 S 909 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); Wis. STAT. ANN.
S 199.10 (West Supp. 1986). Encouragement has also been in the form of requiring utilities to

52.

pay the expenses of intervenors. See, e.g., CAL. PuB. UTIL. CODE S 1801 (Supp. 1986); IDAHO
CODE S 61-617A (Supp. 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. S 216B.16(10) (Supp. 1987).

55. Toward Utility Rate Normalization v. Pacific Gas & Elec., 70 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 183,
185 (Cal. P.U.C. 1984).
56.

Id. at 197.

57. Id. at 198.
58. Compare id. at 197 (no controls on content of Progress or TURN's inserts) with ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 111 2/3 S 909 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985) (illustrating heightened control over content of
billing envelope inserts) and Wis. STAT. ANN. S 199.10 (West Supp. 1986) (control over content
of billing envelope inserts).
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The most intriguing feature of the California approach was its imaginative
xationale for granting access. Possibly drawing guidance from a comment in
Justice Blackmun's Consolidated Edison dissent, 9 the foundation of the order was
the Commission's declaration that the excess space in the billing envelope (beyond that necessary to carry the bill) was "properly considered as ratepayer
property.''"' Given this property right characterization and the value of exposing
ratepayers to a variety of points of view, the Commission sought to allocate
the excess space fairly between the utility and other speakers.
Before examining the Supreme Court's response to the California Commission's access order, it is important to note the constitutional issue that may
have been lost in the shuffle. Subsidization through use of the billing envelope
occurs whether a utility or an opponent speaks. Moreover, it seems possible
-even likely - that many ratepayers are as disinclined to be associated with
the views of a CUB or an intervenor organization like TURN as they are with
a utility's opinion. The fact that a diversity of views may be represented, some
of which each ratepayer may favor, eases, but hardly seems to solve the problem.
Thus, the access approach does not directly respond to the Abood associational
rights issue which Justice Blackmun found so compelling in Consolidated Edison.

59.

Justice Blackmun observed in Consolidated Edison:
Since it is the ratepayers who pay for the billing packet, I doubt that the Court would
find a law establishing their ownership of the packet violative of either the Takings Clause
or the First and Fourteenth Amendments. If, under state law, the envelope belongs to the
customers, I do not see how restricting the utility from using it could possibly be held to
deprive the utility of its rights.
447 U.S. at 556 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). It is important to note that Justice Blackmun's comments concerned ownership of the "billing packet," while the California Commission's order was
based on the space therein.
60. Application of Pacific Gas & Electric Co., Dec. No. 93887, Finding of Fact No. 58 (Cal.
P.U.C. Dec. 30, 1981), cited in Toward Utility Rate Normalization v. Pacific Gas & Elec., 70
Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 183, 186 (Cal. P.U.C. 1984). In TURN, the Commission explained its reasoning:
Our conclusion concerning the ownership of the extra space resulted from our analysis
of the unique factors which allow this issue to exist. It was clear then as it is now that
envelope and postage costs and any other costs of mailing bills are a necessary part of
providing utility service to the customer, so the costs are a legitimate revenue requirement
which we should, and do, permit PG&E to include in the rates it collects from ratepayers.
However, due to the nature of postal rates (which are assessed in increments of one ounce)
extra space exists in these billing envelopes. If we regarded that extra space as the property
of PG&E, then the result would be that along with PG&E's legitimate cost of mailing it
would also be entitled to profit from the economic value of that extra space. Such a result
is inequitable because it provides PG&E with a benefit beyond the mailing expense legitimately recoverable from the ratepayers. Mindful that the extra space is an artifact
generated with ratepayer funds, and is not an intended or necessary item of rate base,
and that the only alternative treatment would unjustly enrich PG&E and simultaneously
deprive the ratepayers of the value of that space, we concluded that the extra space in
the billing envelope "is properly considered as ratepayer property."
70 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th at 186 (citation omitted).
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THE BILL INSERT ALTERNATIVE

Issue Framing and Pacific Gas & Electric

The Supreme Court has relied on property ownership as the determinant
of first amendment rights in cases ranging from flag desecration in Spence v.
Washington" to messages on license plates in Wooley v. Maynard."2 Under this
approach the California Commission seemed to have found a plausible basis
for its grant of access to the billing envelope. If the space was ratepayers'
property, the Commission's order did not compel the utility to publish the
messages of others; it merely directed the utility to relinquish control of space
owned by others. In essence, the decision had the effect of taking a portion of
the subsidy the utility enjoyed in mailing its own "newspaper," Progress,"' and
reallocating this benefit to alternative speakers.
Although relatively straightforward, this position ran into difficulties even
at the preliminary stage of framing the precise issue the Court would address.
Six Justices of the eight-member Court defined the issue as, "whether the
California Public Utility Commission may require a privately owned company
to include in its billing envelopes speech of a third party with which the utility
disagrees.""16 4 Justice Stevens saw the case as somewhat less earth-shaking than
one involving "compelled speech." Instead, he posed the problem, as "whether
a state public utility commission may require the fund-raising solicitation of a
consumer advocacy group to be carried in a utility billing envelope." ' ' , In short,
according to Justice Stevens, "the question is limited to whether the Commission's requirement that it be a courier for the message of a third party
violates the Constitution.""' Under this view, the issue was indistinguishable
from content regulation in a great variety of commercial communications.
The California Public Utilities Commission's opinion was vague concerning
the wording TURN should use in its solicitations. Language can be found to
support either Justice Stevens' or the majority's view of the issue." Whichever
61. 418 U.S. 405 (1974). See generally Dorsen & Goren, supra note I1,at 205-06 (state cannot
interfere with desecration of a privately owned flag displayed on private property).

62. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
63. .The order of the California Commission permitted access by TURN four times per year.
Progress could still be included in those mailings but any additional cost would be charged to the
utility. Toward Utility Rate Normalization v. Pacific Gas & Elec., 70 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 183,
207 (Cal. P.U.C. 1984).
64. 106 S. Ct. at 905. The six included the four-Justice plurality as well as Justices Rehnquist
and White in dissent. Justices Rehnquist and White do not expressly concur with the plurality on
the issue presented but seem implicitly to accept the plurality's definition.
Justice Blackmun did not participate in the opinion.
65. Id. at 922 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 923-24. Justice Stevens relied on an analogous requirement under securities law
that the incumbent board of directors transmit messages of dissident shareholders. Id.
68. The California Commission did not place any specific controls over the content of TURN's
messages. However, the clear objective was the solicitation of funds for participation in rate hearings
on behalf of ratepayers. But see id. at 911 n.10 (distinguishing Justice Steven's analogy of TURN's
inserts to the mailing of minority shareholder statements by the management of a corporation).
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version is more accurate, a plurality of the Court appeared anxious to "boot-

strap" the Commission's requirement into the ominous issue of compelled speech.
It did so by emphasizing the freedom TURN had with respect to the content
of its message while de-emphasizing the California Commission's ultimate purpose in granting TURN access."' In addition, the plurality reasoned that solicitation was only necessary because TURN's views would differ from those
of the utility."'
Although six members of the Court concurred on the broader definition of
the issue, only a four-member plurality unequivocally agreed that the California
decision infringed on both the positive and negative first amendment rights of
the utility." Before examining the plurality opinion, Justice Marshall's concurring opinion is noteworthy. 72 Not only did he provide the "swing vote" in
the eight-Justice Court, but he addressed an issue different from that posed by
Justice Stevens or the plurality. Justice Marshall directly questioned the state's
"ability to redefine its common-law property rights" and found that it had
exceeded its authority."t In so doing, he distinguished PruneYard Shopping Center
v. Robins,7 4 in which the Court upheld a California Supreme Court ruling that
the state's constitution permitted leaflet distribution in privately-owned shopping
centers despite the owner's objections. 7 First, Justice Marshall noted, Pacific
Gas and Electric (PG&E) had not permitted public access to billing envelopes
to the degree that the public had been afforded access to the shopping center
grounds in PruneYard?" In effect, the owners in PruneYard had already "abandoned" the right to exclude the public; PG&E had not. Second, TURN's use
of billing envelope space would actually interfere with the utility's ability to
speak. In PruneYard, however, the shopping center owner's speaking ability was
unhampered."

69. See, e.g., id. at 910 n.9.
70. Id. at 910.
71. The plurality consisted of Justice Powell, who wrote the opinion, Justices O'Connor and
White and Chief Justice Burger. Id. at 905. Although the Chief Justice concurred in the opinion
written by Justice Powell, he wrote a separate opinion in which he stated that he felt it was
unnecessary to go beyond the plurality's analysis of associational rights. Id. at 914 (Burger, C.J.,
concurring).
Chief Justice Burger also indicated that one could not distinguish between compelling the utility
to carry the messages of others in billing envelopes and requiring it to carry messages on "its
trucks, its buildings, or other property used in the conduct of its business." Id. The Chief Justice's
ability to distinguish seems surprisingly limited. The billing envelope was already dedicated to the
purpose of communication; the other property he lists was not. However, the classes of property
he lists are all paid for by ratepayers. This suggests that the utility should be required to use that
property for the benefit of ratepayers. See infta text accompanying notes 127-31.
72. Justice Marshall concurred in the judgment. Id. at 914-17 (Marshall, J., concurring).
73. Id. at 915.
74. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
75. See generally Dorsen & Gora, supra note 11, at 223-26; Van Alstyne, supra note 11, at 7477; Cox, The Supreme Court 1979 Tem: State Guaranteed Right to Speak in Privately Owned Shopping
Centers, 94 HARv. L. REv. 169, 169-78 (1980).
76. 106 S. Ct. at 915-16.
77. Id. at 916. According to Justice Marshall, "[b]y appropriating, four times a year, the
space in appellant's envelope that appellant would otherwise use for its own speech, the State has
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Affirmative Speech

In finding an infringement of the utility's affirmative first amendment rights,
the plurality, per Justice Powell, relied heavily on Miami Herald Publishing Co.
v. Tornillo.7 s In Tonillo, the Court held unconstitutional a Florida statute requiring newspapers to give political candidates an opportunity to respond to
criticism made by the newspaper." The Tornillo Court reasoned that the right
of reply interfered with the newspaper's rights of free speech by discouraging
discussion that might trigger the right to reply." In effect, the right to reply
penalized the newspaper's unfettered editorial expression.
The plurality in Pacific Gas & Electric distinguished California's insert order
from the statute in Tornillo, noting that the right of reply in the latter was
"triggered by a particular category of newspaper speech.""' The Justices saw
a crucial similarity between the two cases, however, in that access and the right
to reply were awarded only to those disagreeing with the views of the initial
speaker . 2 Thus, the utility "must contend with the fact that whenever it speaks
out on a given issue, it may be forced . . .to help disseminate hostile views. " "

A logical consequence, the Court surmised, was that the utility would become
more circumspect in its own speech. 84
1.

Misapplying Tornillo

The invocation of Tornillo is troublesome because of the fundamental distinction between a right to reply and access. Tornillo concerned a true right to

necessarily curtailed petitioner's use of its own forum." Id. If Justice Marshall is suggesting that
the utility may not engage in mailings during the months in which TURN's inserts are included,
he seems to have misunderstood the Commission's order. The only other possible curtailment would
be by virtue of elimination of the "free ride" enjoyed by the utility, a measure which Justice
Marshall seems to indicate is acceptable and which the utility conceded was permissible. See id. at
915 n.1 (Marshall, J., concurring).

78. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
79. Id. at 258. The statute in question read as follows:
If any newspaper in its columns assails the personal character of any candidate for nomination or for election in any election, or charges said candidate with malfeasance or
misfeasance in office, or otherwise attacks his official record, or gives to another free space
for such purpose, such newspaper shall upon request of such candidate immediately publish
free of cost any reply he may make thereto in as conspicuous a place and in the same

kind of type as the matter that calls for such reply, provided such reply does not take up
more space than the matter replied to...

Access to the Press A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1641 (1967); Geller, Does Red Lion Square with
Tornillo, 29 U. MIAMI L. REV. 477 (1975) (comparison between government control of broadcasting
and control of the press); Comment, supra note 20 (reconciling Red Lion and Tornillo).
80. 418 U.S. at 256-58.
81. 106 U.S. at 910.
FLA. STAT. ANN. S 104.38 (West 1973) (repealed 1974). See generally Barron,

82. Id. It is unclear, however, whether the California Commission was limiting access to
those opposing the views of the utility. See Toward Utility Rate Normalization v. Pacific Gas &
Elec., 70 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 183, 198-99 (Cal. P.U.C. 1984).
83. 106 S. Ct. at 910.

84.

Id.
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reply; the content of the newspaper triggered the respondent's right to include
his or her own message. The effect, as the Tornillo Court properly observed,
could force the newspaper to be more cautious in expressing its thoughts. The
decision of the California Public Service Commission, however, granted access
not a right to reply - which was unrelated to the volume or content of
the utility's own bill insert.
Since the utility could not preclude discussion of particular topics by not
mentioning them itself, it is difficult to comprehend the Tornillo-effect upon
which the plurality relied. At most, by not addressing particular issues the utility
might avoid suggesting possible subject matter to competing speakers. 5 Certainly
this stretches Tornillo beyond recognition and attributes to TURN, a consumer
oriented group, very little imagination. Morever; as stressed by Justices Rehnquist, White, and Stevens, in dissent, the constitutionality of state action having
such a remote and speculative impact on speech seems to have been well-settled
by a long line of cases permitting government involvement as direct as that in
Pacific Gas & Electric. "'
The use of Tornillo is disturbing for another reason. Under the view taken
by the Pacific Gas & Electric plurality, a choice had to be made. If TURN were
permitted access, the utility would become a less active speaker; if the utility
were to remain active, the ratepayer organization would have to be squelched.
The selection of the utility over the ratepayer organization is without an apparent foundation. The utility could have claimed priority based on ownership
of the excess space. But the utility did not challenge the Commission's decision
that the excess space was the property of the ratepayers. 7 Similarly, the utility
could have claimed an exclusive right to the "free ride" subsidy made possible
through use of the billing envelope. Here again, no such claim was made.
Instead, the plurality apparently based its choice on the wholly unsupported
notion that the utility's insert was comparable to a newspaper and deserved
the same level of protection."
2.

State "Neutrality"

and Subsidization

The principal shortcoming of the plurality's analysis of affirmative first
amendment rights is its limited vision of the actual substance of the Commission's order and of the constitutional guidelines available to govern such actions.
The utility made no claim, nor did the plurality suggest that the Commission's
assignment of the property interest in the excess space "was constitutionally
suspect."" In effect, the Commission deemed the excess space the property of
85. See id. at 920 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 917-18 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam); Regan v. Taxpayers with Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983); PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447
U.S. 74 (1980)).
87.

106 S. Ct. at 915 n.1 (Marshall, J., concurring).

88. Id. at 908-10.
89. TURN pressed a "takings" claim before the California Public Utilities Commission which
relied primarily on PruneYard to find no violation of the fifth or fourteenth amendments. See Toward
Utility Rate Normalization v. Pacific Gas & Elec., 70 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 183, 202-04 (Cal.
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ratepayers, held in trust by the Commission or the utility. The Commission
sought to manage it as a nonpublic forum." Likewise, the utility did not claim
that access directly impeded its own speech by occupying all of the excess space
in the four billings per year in which access was allowed. The Commission's
order permitted the utility to mail Progress with each month's bill, but the
utility was less likely to retain the "free ride" it previously enjoyed.",' Reduced
subsidization, however, would hardly constitute a compelling basis for such a
claim. Even Consolidated Edison, the Court's strongest statement upholding utilities' rights to speak through the medium of the billing envelopes, does not
require subsidization through a "free ride" in the envelope.'
The action of the Commission, therefore, did not raise an issue as to the
assignment of property rights or the utility's right to continue in its position
as sole beneficiary of the "free ride." Instead, the Commission's order was
nothing more than a state's decision to alter the allocation of the subsidy inherent in access to the excess space in the billing envelope. In short, the Commission merely designated a class of speakers - ratepayer organizations - to
receive the subsidy. Although the Court did not address the constitutionality
of naming a particular group to receive the subsidy, it would hardly seem
objectionable. For example, in Regan v. Taxation With Representation' the Court
held constitutional a government subsidy in the form of grants of tax exempt
status to some lobbying organizations and not to others. The subsidy passed
constitutional muster because the government's goal was not the suppression
of particular ideas or speech. 94
In three recent nonpublic forum cases, the Court similarly upheld government subsidies extended to designated groups. In Perry Education Association v.

Perry Local Educators' Assciation,15 school authorities gave an in-

cumbent teachers' union access to teachers' mailboxes and an interschool mail
P.U.C. 1984). This finding was not appealed to the Supreme Court. See generally Hanschen, Harris
& Woo, Consumer Access to Utility Mailings: First Amendment and Other Issues, 5 ENERoY L.J. 327, 34445 (1984); Comment, Access to Public Utility Communications: Limits Under the Fifth
and First Amendments,
21 SAN Diuco L. REv. 391, 395-405 (1984) (allowing consumer groups access to public utilities
mailings may violate fifth amendment takings clause).
90. See Committee of More Than I Million California Taxpayers to Save Prop. 13 v. Pacific
Gas & Elec., Dec. No. 84-10-062 (Cal. P.U.C. Oct. 17, 1984), cited in Appendix to theJurisdictional
Statement of Appellant at A-157, A-160 to A-161, Pacific Gas & Elec. v. Public Utils. Comm'n,
106 S. Ct. 903 (1986).
A nonpublic forum is "public property which has not been by tradition or designation a forum
for public communication." Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46
(1983). The notion of nonpublic forum has evidently been extended even to privately-owned but
publicly-controlled property. See United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Grcenburgh Civic Ass'ns,
453 U.S. 114, 129 (1982).
91. As the plurality noted, the utility was permitted to include its own material even during
the months when TURN had access. 106 S. Ct. at 906.
92. See 447 U.S. at 543; see also Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 66 N.Y.2d
369, 488 N.E.2d 83, 497 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1985), appeal dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 1627 (1986).
93. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
94. Id. at 549-50.
95. 460 U.S. 37 (1983); see also Appellees' Joint Petition for Rehearing at 2 n.2, Pacific Gas
& Elec. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 106 S. Ct. 903 (1986).
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system. The Court upheld this grant of exclusive access despite the failure to
award similar privileges to a rival union.", The distinction created what was
essentially a subsidy for the favored union and increased communication costs
for the challenger. The Court reasoned that the distinction was based on status
rather than content and added that "implicit in the concept of the nonpublic
forum is the right to make distinctions in access on the basis of subject matter
and speaker identity." 7
A similar issue arose in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund'
in which government officials permitted certain groups access to public employees for the purpose of charitable solicitations, but denied permission to
others. Justice O'Conner articulated the standard for determining whether the
discrimination passed constitutional muster: "Control over access to a nonpublic
forum can be based on subject matter and speaker identity so long as the
distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the purposes served by the forum
and are viewpoint neutral." 9 9 The same standard appears in United States Postal
Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Associations,"' a case extending nonpublic
forum analysis to privately-owned property.""
Regan, as well as the nonpublic forum cases, sends a clear signal that the
Court will afford states substantial leeway to grant subsidies to particular organizations. The consistent message of these cases is that discrimination cannot
be content-based. To be sure, Pacific Gas & Electric was not a case involving
an excluded speaker's challenge to an incumbent speaker's access to billing
envelopes. Looking at Pacific Gas & Electric in a slightly different light,
however, illustrates its inconsistency with these other decisions. Prior to the
request by TURN, the California Commission had already permitted the utility
to take advantage of the billing envelope subsidy. This grant is analogous to
the incumbent union's use of the school mail system in Perry. If the California
Commission had subsequently denied access to TURN because it feared TURN's
speech would be offensive to the utility, then the principles of Perry, Cornelius,
and Greenburgh would be violated.
The obvious problem with the approach of the Pacfic Gas & Electric plurality
is that it ultimately requires content-based subsidization. A more insightful analysis would have involved weighing the dangers of withholding subsidization
of speech due to its content against the dangers of the speculative Tornillo-effect.
The Court, "" however, by not characterizing the Commission's action as a
subsidy reallocation, missed an opportunity to balance these competing dangers
to free speech and produced a result that is at odds with first amendment
standards.

96. 460 U.S. at 55.
97. Id. at 49.
98. 105 S. Ct. 3439 (1985).
99. Id. at 3451.
100.

453 U.S. 114 (1981).

101. Id. at 133-34.
102. Justice Marshall can be included with the plurality as far as overlooking the substance
of the Califoria Commission's action.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1986

17

Florida Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 3 [1986], Art. 1
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

C.

[Vol. XxXVIII

The Right Not to Speak

The plurality's concern for the utility's negative first amendment rights was
founded primarily on Tornillo and to a lesser extent on Wooley v. Maynard.""
Here, Justice Powell looked to the following language in Tornilo: "treatment
of public issues and public officials - whether fairly or unfairly - constitute[s]
the exercise of editorial control and judgment."1'1 Writing for the plurality, he
interpreted this language as an indication of the Tornillo Court's belief that the
right to reply may force the newspaper to "tailor its speech to an opponent's
agenda,11''5 thus interfering with the individual's right to speak or remain silent.
He then reasoned that by choosing the alternative of remaining silent the utility
risked appearing to be associated with views with which it disagreed. The right
not to be associated with such views is protected by Wooley and, in what must
be regarded as a very broad reading by Justice Powell, by Tornillo.
In linking the order of the California Commission to Wooly, the plurality
was required to discuss, but avoided directly confronting, the property rights
assignment issue. It distinguished the excess space in the billing envelopes from
the envelope itself and then analogized the envelope, which remained the property of the utility, to the automobile in Wooley.""3 The plurality concluded that
"the Commission's access order . . . requires appellant to use its property as

a vehicle for spreading a message with which it disagrees.""' 7 By opting for
the billing envelope as the relevant property, the plurality avoided the federalism
and substantive due process issues that direct analysis of the Commission's
classification of the excess space as the property of ratepayers would have raised.108
Although clearly choosing the envelope as the determinant property interest,
the plurality equivocated on the importance of its ownership. At first glance,
the plurality apparently did little more than play the "property rights equals speech
rights" game and trump the California Commission in the process.109 On the other
hand, the plurality admitted that the result in Tornillo would have been the
same even if the paper upon which the replies were printed had been the
property of subscribers or the candidates. Accordingly, "[t]he constitutional

103.

430 U.S. 705 (1977). See generally Comment, Unconstitutional Government Speech, 15

SAN

DIEGO L. REv. 815 (1978) (state law requiring display of a motto on license plate violated first
amendment rights by compelling citizen to engage in speech); Comment, Symbolic Speech and Compelled
Expression: Wooley v. Maynard, 1977 UTAH L. REv. 797 (state ordinance violated citizen's right
to refrain from speaking).
104. 106 S. Ct. at 909 (quoting Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,

258 (1974)).
105. 106 S.Ct. at 909.
106. Id. at 912.
107.

Id. (emphasis in original).

108. Justice Marshall addressed this issue. See supra text accompanying notes 71-77.
109. The California Commission based its opinion on the ownership of the excess space. See
Toward Utility Rate Normalization v. Pacific Gas & Elec., 70 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 183, 185-86
(Cal. P.U.C. 1984); supra text accompanying notes 53-58. The Supreme Court emphasized that
the actual "vehicle" was the billing envelope. 106 S. Ct. at 912. Ironically, the plurality opinion
is, in a sense, consistent with Justice Blackmun's thoughts in Consolidated Edison concerning the
relevant property interest. See supra note 59.
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difficulty with the right-to-reply statute was that it required the newspaper to
disseminate a message with which the newspaper disagreed."'"'" Having identified a possible area of independence between property rights and speech rights,
the Pacific Gas & Electric plurality reversed field again and finally rested its
decision on the conclusion that "[t]he Commission's order forces appellant to
disseminate TURN's speech in envelopes that appellant owns and that bear appellant's return address.""' In sum, in spite of language suggesting the contrary, what seemed to make "forced dissemination" unacceptable to the plurality
was the utility's ownership of the relevant medium.
The plurality's reasoning on the issue of negative first amendment rights
rests on two assumptions. First, requiring TURN's inserts to "clearly identify
TURN as its source and state that its contents have been neither reviewed nor
endorsed by PG&E"' 2 was insufficient to disassociate the utility from TURN's
speech. According to Justice Powell, the disclaimer indicated only that the words
of the insert were not those of the utility; the utility could still feel pressured
'
to reply."13 The plurality distinguished PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, " in
'
which the ability to disclaim was critical," on the basis of the lower likelihood
that the views actually expressed would be disagreeable to the shopping center
owner.'

b

If the utility were not sufficiently disassociated, then, according to the plurality, the utility would feel pressure to reply, thus permitting TURN to dictate
whether the utility would speak, as well as the subject matter of its speech.'
This "forced reply" problem, however, requires a second assumption that
the utility will feel more pressure to reply to a disclaimed bill insert than to
a message by TURN in any other medium."" In short, in the plurality's view,
bill inserts, even when accompanied by express disclaimers, are uniquely capable
of eliciting a reply.
Whether the utility will feel more pressure to respond to a fully disclaimed
bill insert or an advertisement in the Los Angeles Times is, of course, an empirical
question. The answer hinges to a great extent on the effectiveness of the disclaimer. On this point, the plurality's analysis is weak. The Justices do not
explain precisely why an insert stating that the utility does not endorse the
views expressed would create a situation in which the utility "may be forced
to appear to agree with TURN's views or respond. ' ' 19 This speculation rivals

110. 106 S. Ct. at 913.
111. Id. (emphasis added).
112. Toward Utility Rate Normalization v. Pacific Gas & Elec., 70 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 183,
207-08 (Cal. P.U.C. 1984).

113.

106 S. Ct. at 911 n.ll.

114.
115.
116.

Id. at 909-10.
PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 87.
106 S. Ct. at 910.

117.

Id. at 909.

118. See generally id. at 920 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (right of access to utility's billing envelope
should be constitutionally protected as in PruneYard).
119. Id. at 911.
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that found in the analysis of the Tornillo-effect discussed earlier. 2 Furthermore,
the attempt to distinguish PruneYard falls short. To suggest that the disclaimer is useful in PruneYard because the shopping center owner is less likely
to disagree with speakers on shopping center property than the utility is to
disagree with TURN, comes very dose to saying that a disclaimer was effective
in PruneYard because it was unnecessary and ineffective in Paific Gas & Electric
because it was necessary.
The effort to distinguish PruneYard is unconvincing for another reason. In
that case, the shopping center owner, who presumably had to survey the nature
of the speech and determine whether or not to disclaim, was also burdened with
making the actual disclaimer.' M Evidently, the mere opportunity to disclaim
was sufficient protection. In Pacific Gas & Electric, TURN was charged with
the responsibility of indicating that its views were not those of the utility.'22
Although it is a minor matter in the overall context of the issue, it seems
inconsistent to find a scheme of protection permissible when it thrusts the shopping center owner into the position of guarding his philosophical flanks, but
inadequate when the utility is relieved of any such responsibility.
What emerges from the plurality's strained analysis on the issue of negative
rights - and positive rights for that matter - is an indication of the extent
to which the holding rests on a property rights analysis. Far from being an
afterthought, (as one might infer from its position in the opinion) the plurality's
classification of the envelope, rather than the space therein, as the relevant
property is the only argument in Pacific Gas & Electric that is marked by some
consistency and integrity.
When the plurality falls back to a property rights analysis, however, its
activist nature is exposed. A comparison of Pacific Gas & Electric with the Court's
earlier response to state-ordered access in PruneYard is particularly revealing.
The cases are not as dissimilar as the plurality suggests. The same arguments
that favor classifying the envelope as the determining property right for the dissemination of messages in Pacific Gas & Electric were applicable in PruneYard. The
shopping center owner did own the actual physical vehicle within which the
communication was contained. The shopping center was, in effect, a stationary
envelope in which shoppers were invited to roam and receive messages.
Thus, the vehicle for the message in both cases was clearly labeled as the
property of someone who may not agree with the views expressed therein. If
property, dissemination, and involuntary association are the decisive factors, as the
Pacific Gas & Electric plurality indicates, then PruneYard looks like an anomaly.
It is more likely that at least four members of the Court are willing to create
first amendment law on an ad hoc basis.
This activism is also evident in the invocation of Wooley. That decision is
quite obviously steeped in a desire to protect individuals from compelled com-

120. See supra text accompanying notes 85-88.
121. 447 U.S. at 87.
122. See Toward Utility Rate Normalization v. Pacific Gas & Elec., 70 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th
183, 207-08 (Cal. P.U.C. 1984).
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munication of messages that are inconsistent with their convictions. 23 The goal
of the state was to disseminate its message by using vehicles wholly-owned and
controlled by other speakers. The Court responded to the plight of individuals
compelled to carry the state's message or face criminal penalties. Paific Gas &
Electric, on the other hand, involves no such meaningful conviction. Moreover,
the Commission's goal was not to force the utility to carry its message, but
rather to spread the messages of those representing ratepayers' interests.' 2 4 Finally, although the envelope remained the utility's property, the space inside
was, without issue, the property of the ratepayers. Thus, the vehicle as a whole
was, in fact, not privately-owned or controlled to the same degree as the automobile in Wooley. If the reasoning, facts, and ideals of Wooley count at all,
it is difficult to see how a public utility's exclusive access to its billing envelope
125
merits the same first amendment protection.
D.

Overview

The plurality's explanation of how the access order violated both affirmative
and negative first amendment interests is not convincing. Justice Marshall's
opinion concurring in the judgment is noteworthy because he addresses the
fundamental substantive issue, the state's power to redefine property rights.
Unfortunately, he attempts to distinguish PruneYard and invoke Wooley in a manner similar to the plurality's approach. Furthermore, a possible misunderstanding of the actual impact of access on the utility's own ability to communicate
weakens his opinion.'

26

123. The Wooley Court relied on the ideals of West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624 (1943), which held unconstitutional a state requirement that school children participate
in a flag salute ritual. According to the Wooley Court, "[a] system which secures the right to
proselytize religious, political and ideological causes must also guarantee the concomitant right to
decline to foster such concepts. The right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are
complementary components of the broader 'individual freedom of mind.' " 430 U.S. at 714 (quoting
Bamete, 319 U.S. at 637).
124. Toward Utility Rate Normalization v. Pacific Gas & Elec, 70 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 183,
185-87 (Cal. P.U.C. 1984).
125. Having determined that the access requirement infringed the first amendment interests
of the utility, the plurality considered whether the infringement was justified by a compelling state
interest or was a permissible time, place or manner restriction. 106 S. Ct. at 913-14. The state
argued that it had a compelling interest in the beneficial effect of the access order on ratemaking
proceedings because the measure would enable TURN to assist the Commission. The plurality
rejected the justification, noting that TURN could be awarded costs when it participated in ratemaking proceedings, without violating the utility's first amendment rights. Id. at 913. The Court
rejected the argument that a desire to make a variety of views available to consumers justified the
access order, because the access order was not content-neutral. Id. at 914. The Court likewise
rejected the time, place, and manner justification because the restriction was not content-neutral.
Id.
126. Justice Marshall noted that the interference with the utility is slight. Id. at 916 (Marshall,
J., concurring). However, he did not refer to the extra cost borne by the utility if it chose to
include its insert during the months that TURN was entitled to use the "extra space." Id. at 915
n.l. Nor was the infringement he saw limited to the utility's desire to remain silent. Id. at 916.
Thus, he apparently believed that the utility could not send Progress during those months when
TURN was granted access.
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Two aspects of the plurality opinion are especially curious, even telling.
First, the decision seems at odds with PruneYard and Wooley, the two property
right/first amendment cases on which the Pacific Gas & Electric plurality relies
so heavily. Second, the plurality had a choice of two relevant property rights
in defining the rights of speakers the excess space or the envelope. The
Court eschewed its steady adherence to the principles of federalism, skirted the
edges of substantive due process, and chose as controlling the property right
the state deemed not to be controlling. Because the Court obviously ruled in
opposition to its historical tendencies, the critical inquiry becomes one of determining the plurality's real agenda. Perhaps it is simple at least four
Justices desired to further expand corporate first amendment rights to equal
those of individuals. Pacific Gas & Electric offered that opportunity. Unfortunately, the context involved speakers so unlike other individual and corporate
speakers that economic factors, as well as precedent, should have counselled
the Court otherwise.
III.

UTILTEs AFTER Consolidated Edison AND Pacific Gas & Electric

Despite the holding in Consolidated Edison and the broad language of Pafic
Gas & Electric, questions remain concerning the possibility of constitutionally
requiring, or at least strongly encouraging, utilities to carry the messages of
others in their billing envelopes. The success of any further attempts by state
regulatory bodies hinges on two factors. First, is the message of the speaker
political or commercial? Obviously, Pacific Gas & Electric largely eliminates the
direct order possibility in the context of political speech. Commercial speech
is, arguably, another matter.
Second, does the state action involve a direct order or is it one that indirectly
affects the utility's decisionmaking by bringing to bear the pressures of traditional ratemaking? A useful analogy lies in the reaction of the New York Public
Service Commission to ConsolidatedEdison. Prohibited from barring political speech,
the Commission simply raised the price of speaking by allocating to the utility
one-half the cost of a mailing containing political inserts.'1 7 The Supreme Court
determined that the measure raised no substantial federal question."
Indirect efforts to encourage access by organizations other than the utility
necessitate adopting the view that the billing envelope is like any other utility
asset for that ratepayers were billed. 129 As such, the utility must use the envelope
in a manner that best benefits ratepayers. Thus, state regulatory bodies could
deny utilities the right to collect from ratepayers the fair market value of the
excess envelope space. The fair market value is equal to the income that could
be earned through the sale of the excess billing envelope space to advertisers."" Excess space would be envelope capacity beyond that necessary for
127.
N.Y.S.2d
128.
129.

Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 66 N.Y.2d 369, 488 N.E.2d 83, 497
337 (1985), appeal dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 1627 (1986).
Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 106 S. Ct. 1627 (1986).
Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Pacific Gas & Electric supports the view that all utility
property is somewhat alike. See 106 S. Ct. at 914.
130. See supra note 34. For discussion of institution of similar actions see Re Southern Bell
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the bill itself, informational messages and a return envelope. The utility would,
therefore, "pay" for any space its own inserts occupied.
Although the indirect approach has a number of other advantages, it is
chiefly a means of encouraging the use of excess billing envelope space for
commercial purposes. The switch from "compelled" political inserts to "compelled" commercial inserts reflects a significant shift in underlying purpose. The
political insert requirement is based on the objectives of exposing ratepayers to
a diversity of views on regulatory issues and off-setting the utility's advantage
in disseminating its ideas by way of the free ride in the envelope. On the other
hand, the commercial speech alternative promotes the goals of increasing efficiency and lowering utility rates.
A.

Political Speech

The likelihood that a state may, after Pacific Gas & Electric, constitutionally
order a public utility to include political inserts with which the utility disagrees
is exceedingly slim. Programs that are factually distinguishable from the California order are probably covered by the language of that decision.'" Indeed,
the plurality essentially granted veto power to utilities concerning the political
material included in the billing envelope. "2 One admittedly narrow possibility
lies in the fact that a majority of the Court defined the issue as concerning
an order requiring "a privately owned utility company to include in its billing
envelopes speech of a third party with which the utility disagrees."""' Suppose,
as Justice Blackmun suggested in Consoldiated Edison,'1 4 a state followed the lead
of the California Commission and decided that the envelope, as well as the
space within it, was the property of ratepayers. The focus of inquiry would
then become whether the Court's classification of the envelope as the utility's
property was crucial to the Pacific Gas & Electric holding.
The Pacific Gas & Electric Court could have implicitly addressed Justice Blackmun's alternative by defining the issue to be whether it was constitutional to
require the utility to disseminate messages with which it disagreed. Although it did
not formulate the issue precisely in this manner, the plurality attempted to articulate

Telephone & Telegraph Co., 68 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 520 (N.C.U.C. 1985); Application of Pacific

Gas & Electric Co., Dec. 93887 (Cal. P.U.C. Dec. 30, 1981), cited in Appendix to the Jurisdictional
Statement of Appellant at A-67 to A-69, Pacific Gas & Elec. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 106 S.
Ct. 903 (1986).
131.

The Wisconsin and Illinois programs, for example, involve the legislative creation of

organizations to be granted access. In these instances the higher degree of government involvement
would reduce the likelihood that access would be constitutional. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 2/3
5 909 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); Wis.

STAT. ANN.

5 199.10 (West Supp. 1986). On the other

hand, Pacific Gas & Electric suggests that the control exercised by these states over actual content
may make the insert requirement less offensive. In any case, in light of the broad language of
Pacific Gas & Electric, the utility seems to retain ultimate control over the political content of the

billing envelope.
132. This inference is based on the plurality's choice of issues to address on appeal. See 106
S. Ct. at 905.
133. Id.
134. 447 U.S. at 556; see supra note 59.
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a rationale that rested more on forced dissemination than on simple ownership
of the envelope or the excess space therein. In the final analysis, the plurality's
effort to distance itself from the property right connection seems without conviction."' In fairness, though, the California Commission's order presented the
Court with such a convenient property right basis for its ultimate decision that
it was not necessary to explore fully the ownership - dissemination distinction.
Indeed, any discussion of the significance of dissemination as a factor independent of ownership may be an indication that a state commission assigning
the envelope to ratepayers would fare no better than the California Commission.
B.

Commercial Speech

1.

The Direct Order

A direct order to carry the commercial speech of others would give rise to
the straightforward issue of compelled commercial speech. Such an order is
unlikely to infringe upon the utility's affirmative first amendment rights. If a
utility were forced to carry the commercial messages of another, the danger
that a Tornillo-effect would inhibit the utility's own commercial, or even political
expression, would be minimal or nonexistent. Even applying the strained reasoning of the Pacific Gas & Electric plurality, it seems unlikely that a utility
would curtail its own speech for fear of putting ideas in the minds of other

commercial speakers. '3

6

The associational interests of the utility could present a more complicated
set of problems. The utility would bear the risk of appearing to endorse certain
products or services, including those of competitors. This problem can be analyzed along two lines of reasoning flowing from the Court's refusal to afford
commercial speech the same degree of protection as political speech.1 37 First,
one can argue a fortiori from Pacific Gas & Electric that a state is precluded from
compelling a speaker to carry the commercial message of another."' A different
result follows, however, when one considers that commercial speech is less pro-

135. See supra text accompanying notes 109-12.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 85-86. The Court has noted, however, that excessive
disclosure requirements may infringe first amendment rights by chilling protected commercial speech.
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 105 S. Ct. 2265, 2282 (1985).
137. Two lines of reasoning support a lower degree of protection. First, less protection is

necessary because commercial speech is inherently durable and verifiable. See Virginia State Bd.
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976). Second,

commercial speech occupies a "subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values."
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978); see Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel, 105 S. Ct. 2265, 2274-75 (1985); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60,
64-65 (1983); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 505 (1981). See generally
Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REv.
1 (1979) (commercial speech less protected than noncommercial speech); Note, ConstitutionalProtection
of Commercial Speech, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 720 (1982) (commercial speech restrictions should be
subjected to strict scrutiny analysis).
138. The argument would be that, although political speech has the highest value, the state
could not compel it. It follows that the state could not compel commercial speech because of its

lower value.
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tected because it is regarded as somehow less important than political speech.'"
This lower status, which increases the freedom of government agencies to regulate or suppress commercial speech, suggests that compelled association with
commercial speech is less threatening to the associational rights of the reluctant
speaker than association with political speech. This is especially true when the

utility uses clear disclaimers to indicate that merely carrying an advertisement
for a product or service does not constitute an endorsement.
The foregoing does not suggest that an associational interest is not at stake

in the case of compelled commercial speech. The protection of this interest,
however, probably has more to do with Cental Hudson Gas & Electric v. New
York Public Service Commission 14 ' than with Pacific Gas & Electric. In Central Hudson,
the Court announced a four-part test for determining the constitutionality of
restrictions on commercial speech. 14 ' The first step of the test is the determi42
nation of whether the speech, in this case the right not to speak, is protected.'
By analogy to political speech, the right to express oneself for commercial purposes probably carries with it the right to remain silent. 4' 1 If so, the remaining
steps of the Central Hudson test must be applied.
The second step requires a finding of a substantial state interest.'" The
state's interest in the commercial context is to ensure more efficient use of the
billing envelope and.to lower utility rates. The best evidence of the Court's
possible view of this issue is found in Central Hudson itself, in which New York
argued that its prohibition of advertising was necessary to further the state's
interests in conservation and in achieving "fair and efficient" rates.' 4 ' Although
the New York ban failed the remaining steps in the four-part test, these interests
were deemed to be "substantial.' 14 ' A state's interest in insuring that the utility
uses the billing envelope, as a resource for which ratepayers are charged, in
a manner that results in lower rates is, arguably, equally substantial.
The final two steps require that the restrictions "directly advance the government's asserted interests, and the restrictions are no more extensive than

139.
140.

See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
447 U.S. 557 (1980).

141. Id. at 566.
142. Id.
143. The ideals fostered by the protection of associational interests as espoused in Barnette,
7rnillo, and Wooley seem inapplicable to commercial speech. The Court has indicated, however,
that disclosure requirements in the commercial context implicate first amendment rights. See, e.g.,
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 105 S. Ct. 2265, 2281-83 (1985). Compelled commercial
speech of the type discussed here would afortori seem to raise first amendment concerns.
144. 447 U.S. at 566.

145. Id. at 568-70.
146. Id. at 568-69. The Court found that the ban on promotional advertising furthered the
state's conservation interest, but rejected the ban as broader than necessary to encourage conservation. Id. at 569-70. It found only a "tenuous" connection between the ban on promotional
advertising and rate equity and efficiency. Id. at 569. The utility claimed advertising could increase
off-peak usage, thereby improving the utilization of equipment. The Commission argued that increasing off-peak usage could also increase peak usage and, in the absence of marginal cost pricing,

all consumers would experience higher rates. The Court was not convinced that increases in offpeak usage would necessarily result in higher rates for all. Id. at 568-69.
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necessary to serve that interest."' 47 The Court recently described this stage of
the analysis as involving "a consideration of the 'fit' between the legislature's
ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends.' '148 Here, one can argue
that the only way to insure the efficient use of the excess capacity of resources
for which ratepayers are charged is to order that the excess capacity be sold for
its fair market value. 149 In short, the "fit" would be perfect.
Generally, attempts to predict the Court's eventual resolution of any issue
are hazardous,'" and compelled commercial speech is no exception. The above
line of reasoning is vulnerable on a number of points. First, although the primary
reason for protecting commercial speech suggests otherwise, the Court could
find that a state has no greater power to compel commercial speech than it
does to force political speech. Additionally, in the context of applying the Central
Hudson test, the substantial interest in lower rates as a justification for compelling
commercial speech and the conservation and rate fairness interests cited in
Central Hudson itself are distinguishable. 51' In short, in that mysterious judicial
process of determining a substantial state interest, the Court might conclude
that, in light of the dangers of compelled commercial association, the interest
in lower rates is simply not substantial. Finally, depending upon how effective
one believes an indirect approach to be, the direct order might be found more
restrictive than necessary.
2.

The Fair Market Value Approach

The Supreme Court's response to the New York Commission's cost allocation measure suggests that the major advantage of deducting from allowable
revenues the amount for which excess envelope space could be sold lies in the
likelihood that such an order would not raise a substantial federal question.2;
One should not, however, infer too much from the Court's denial of review.
A fair market value approach might receive different treatment. The actual
economic impact of such a scheme could be much larger than a mere cost
allocation. The possibility exists, therefore, that a disallowance of the fair market
value would be classified as a penalty for exercising the constitutional right not
to speak and the Court might apply a traditional first amendment analysis. The
problem is further complicated if the highest bidder is one wishing to express
a political view with which the utility is not in agreement.
If review were granted and a standard first amendment analysis applied,
there remains another important advantage of the fair market value approach.
147. Id. at 566.
148. Posadas De P.R. Assocs. v. Puerto Rico Tourism Co., 106 S. Ct. 2968, 2977 (1986).
149. The alternative of deducting the fair market value but leaving the utility the option of
not selling the extra space to the highest bidder is less effective as a means of generating lower
rates. See supra text accompanying notes 34-43.
150. See, e.g., Harrison, supra note 4.
151. The state's interest in Central Hudson was that the rates be "fair and efficient." 447 U.S.
at 569. The specific concern seemed to be that consumers not absorb power generating expenses
that their consumption did not create. The objective was to match consumers with the expenses
their consumption actually caused the utility to incur.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 51-53.
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As suggested above, the direct order alternative may be weak on the final aspect
of the Central Hudson test - the fit between the state's goal and the restriction.
The Court might reason that a direct order is more restrictive than necessary
because the fair market value approach achieves the same goal of rate reduction
while leaving the utility with a choice not to carry another's message. In fact,
economic analysis suggests the approaches are not equally effective. 153 If a utility
chooses not to carry the message of the highest bidder and to absorb the
adjustment in allowable revenue, ratepayers will eventually feel the impact. Still,
given the apparent level of the Court's responsiveness to public utility economics, one might expect the indirect approach to be viewed as less restrictive and
equally effective. The fair market value approach is, therefore, more likely to
survive constitutional review.
IV.

SUMMARY

In Consolidated Edison the Supreme Court missed, or chose to ignore, the
fact that first amendment and economic regulation issues merge when public
utilities speak. By prohibiting states from barring the use of billing envelopes
for political purposes, the Consolidated Edison Court permitted the subsidization
of the political activites of utilities by ratepayers, willing or not. But that decision
did anything but quell regulators' desire to diminish the "free ride" advantage
utilities enjoy through use of billing envelopes.
One approach has been to permit access to the billing envelope by speakers
other than the utility. After Pacfic Gas & Electric this approach seems broadly
prohibited. Indeed,the strength of this conviction, at least for a plurality of the
Paciic Gas & Electric Court, is exposed by the straining necessary to reach the
result. The plurality may have been simply expressing its conviction that corporate speakers should enjoy the same first amendment protection as other
speakers. If so, it is unfortunate that, in its zeal to deliver this message, the
plurality did not heed the important distinctions between public utilities and
other corporate speakers.
The remaining alternative is to raise the price to the utility of using billing
envelopes for political purposes. An allocation of a share of the total mailing
expense to the utility when its own political inserts are included accomplishes
this. So far, such policies have met with success because the Court seems anxious
to avoid issues requiring a direct inquiry into rate regulation., 14 Whether the
Court would draw the line at an extreme cost allocation remains to be seen.
In any case, economic analysis indicates that this approach would not fully
shield ratepayers from involuntary subsidization of the utility's political activities.
For those whose primary focus is simply to ensure lower rates for ratepayers,
additional alternatives remain. "" The best course of action is to regard the
excess space in the billing envelope in the same manner as any other asset for
153.
154.
155.

See supra text accompanying notes 34-43.
Set supra text accompanying notes 51-53.
For those who wish to encourage intervenor participation on behalf of ratepayers, the

costs of intervention may be charged to the utility. Pacific Gas & Etec., 106 S. Ct. at 913.
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which the utility bills ratepayers and, directly or indirectly, encourage the utility
to sell the space to the highest bidder. A direct approach would entail ordering
the utility to carry the message of those willing to pay the most. An indirect
approach involves deducting from allowable revenues any amount that could
have been collected through sale of space. Both approaches potentially raise
first amendment issues and might not pass constitutional muster. The indirect
approach has certain advantages: it increases the likelihood that the Supreme
Court would deny review; and even if tested under first amendment standards,
it is less restrictive than the direct order approach. Ironically, these advantages
are, in a large measure, a result of the Court's insensitivity to the economic
character of regulated utilities. After Pacific Gas & Electric, a more enlightened
view seems unlikely.
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